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Location Savings: International and Indian Perspective
Pankaj Jain &Vikram Chand*
Outsourcing of operations from high cost countries to low cost countries has given birth to the location savings concept. Overtime, a related broader
concept of location specific advantages (LSA) has emerged, the exploitation of which gives rise to location rents. The determination and allocation of
location savings/LSA and rents is a key TP issue – especially in developing countries. This article outlines the approach expressed on the
aforementioned issue, in the US TP regulations (and court practise), OECD TP Guidelines and the UN TP Manual. Thereafter, the approach of
the Indian tax administration and Courts is scrutinized in light of the international guidance. Finally, the authors provide their view on the road
ahead for determination and allocation of location savings.
1 BACKGROUND
Globalization and competition has led Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs) to move or establish operations in low
cost jurisdictions and take advantage of the resultant
savings. MNEs consider developing economies (such as
BRICS1) as lucrative locations for outsourcing routine
manufacturing and services activities, predominantly
because of the availability of low cost skilled workforce
and low production costs. These growing economies also
provide opportunities to MNEs in terms of differentiated
value-addition, innovation, market penetration, and so on,
even though the initial value proposition to move to such
locations hinged mainly on cost savings. Outsourcing to
low cost jurisdictions is no longer an option for MNEs,
but an essential ingredient to remain competitive on the
world stage.
The setting up of manufacturing and services facilities
in low cost countries and the resultant cost savings has
given rise to the concept of location savings.2 In a nutshell,
location savings are the cost savings (net of dis-savings)
realized by a MNE as a result of relocating certain
activities to a low cost jurisdiction.3 The possibility to
derive location savings may vary from one jurisdiction to
another, depending on various factors such as lower labour,
raw material, transportation, rental, training and
infrastructure costs, or higher subsidies and tax
incentives.4 Overtime, a related broader concept of
location specific advantages (LSA) has emerged, which
recognizes the existence and importance of other location
specific factors of the relevant geographic market, both on
supply and demand side, that may provide some
advantages to the MNE, in addition to costs savings on
relocation. The exploitation of such LSAs gives rise to
location rents.5
From a Transfer Pricing (TP) perspective, the debate has
arisen as to, if location savings/LSAs arise, which
jurisdiction in relocation circumstances should tax them.
While the trend towards relocation of operations to low
cost countries has existed for long, the debate has taken
centre stage due the fact that tax authorities in developing
countries (like India) argue that the economic benefit
arising to the MNE due to shifting of operations to a low
cost jurisdiction should accrue to the country where the
operations are carried out.6 The aggressive approach of the
tax authorities in the application of location savings for
Notes
* Pankaj Jain is the Associate Director, International Tax & Transfer Pricing, Ernst & Young, Hyderabad, India. The author can be contacted on
Pankaj.Jain@in.ey.com.;Vikram Chand, is the Academic Coordinator, Masters of Advanced Studies in International Taxation, University of Lausanne, Switzerland. The author
can be contacted on vikram.chand@unil.ch.
1 The BRICS are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa respectively.
2 Steven N. Allen et al. ‘Location Savings – A US Perspective’, International Transfer Pricing Journal, IBFD, July/August (2004), p. 158.
3 Sebastien Gonnet, Pim Fris and Tommaso Coriano, ‘Location specific advantages – principles’, Transfer Pricing International Journal, BNA (2011), available on http://
www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_TPI_Journal_0611.pdf, p. 1.
4 Pinakin Desai and Shefali Goradia, ‘General Report, Cross-border outsourcing – issues, strategies and solutions’, IFA Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International (2014), Vol. 99a, p. 49.
5 Gonnet, Fris, Coriano, supra n. 3, p. 3.
6 Desai and Goradia, supra n. 4, p. 50.
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determining the pricing for intra-group transactions is a
grave concern for MNEs. Accordingly, a key emerging TP
issue is the determination of location savings/LSAs/
location rents and its allocation between group companies.
This article outlines the approach, expressed for the
aforementioned issue, in the US TP regulations7 (and
court practise), OECD TP Guidelines8 and UN TP
Manual9 (section 2). Thereafter, the approach of the Indian
tax administration and Courts is discussed in light of the
international guidance (section 3). Then, the authors
provide their view on the road ahead for the determination
and allocation of location savings (section 4).
2 THE US,OECD AND UN APPROACH
2.1 The US Approach
The US regulations neither define nor provide a
mechanism to determine location savings. In a limited
manner, it is stated that the allocation of location savings
depends on the relative competitive positions of buyers
and sellers in each market.10 The regulations, through an
example of an US apparel design corporation, which
contracts to its subsidiary in a low cost country,
manufacturing of clothes (which does not require
significant specialized knowledge and could be performed
by several competitors in geographic markets similar to
the subsidiaries’ location), explain that under arm’s length
conditions, additional profit on account of location savings
would not be retained by the subsidiary, because of the
competitive positions of the parties.11
The US Tax Court, on several occasions, has commented
directly/indirectly on the allocation of location savings
among associated enterprises (AE). Notably, in the
Sunstrand12 and Compaq13 cases, wherein a US parent
established a subsidiary in Singapore to optimize on
manufacturing costs, the US Tax Court ruled that location
savings should be allocated to the offshore jurisdictions
because, in the former case the subsidiary, which was
characterized as a full fledged manufacturer, has a
monopolistic position for manufacturing of aviation spare
parts,14 and in the latter case, the subsidiary was the only
manufacturer of computer components in its territory that
could provide the necessary quality standards and
production flexibility that the US parent needed.15 While
the analysis applied by the Tax Court varies in these two
cases, the Court seems to have visualized what
independent parties would have done on an arm’s length
basis taking into consideration the ownership/uniqueness
of intangibles and the bargaining power of the parties to
decide that the location savings should be retained by the
low cost jurisdiction.16
2.2 The OECDApproach
The OECD TP Guidelines17 define18 the concept of
location savings19 in the context of business
restructurings. The guidelines do not comment on how
location savings should be determined but state the
location savings may be shared between related parties on
the basis of what independent parties would have agreed
in similar circumstances, in particular, taking into
Notes
7 All references in this article are to the US Treasury Regulations (1994 as update from time to time) issued under s. 482, US Internal Revenue Code (1986), unless otherwise stated.
8 All references in this article are to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (22 Jul. 2010) unless otherwise stated.
9 All references in this article are to the United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for developing countries (2013) unless otherwise stated.
10 Section 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(C), US Treasury Regulations (1994); Allen et al. supra n. 2, p. 159.
11 Section 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(D), US Treasury Regulations (1994).
12 US Tax Court: Sundstrand Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 96 TC 226, 19 Feb. 1991.
13 US Tax Court: Compaq Computer Corporation and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, TC Memo 1999-220, 2 Jul. 1999.
14 Allen et al. supra n. 2, pp 160–161; Brian P Arthur, Ashleigh E Herbert, Marc M Levey, ‘US Report, Cross-border outsourcing – issues, strategies and solutions’, IFA Cahiers de
Droit Fiscal International (2014), Vol. 99a, pp 798–799.
15 Allen et al. supra n. 2, pp 161–162; Arthur, Herbert, Levey, supra n. 14; Also see Martijn A de Lange and Paul WH Lankhorst, ‘The Impact of Location Advantages on the
Transfer Pricing of Multinationals: On the Chinese Love for European Designer Handbags and Lower Production Costs in India’, International Transfer Pricing Journal, IBFD, July/
August (2014), p. 227.
16 Allen et al. supra n. 2, p. 162; It is pertinent to note that US Courts analysed the transfer price of the manufactured goods and the royalty payment for the use of intangibles
seperately due to their independent significance. Further, even in the absence of local comparables in the offshore jurisdiction, comparable transactions in the US geography
were considered on the finding that the market for the manufactured product is global in scope and competitive; Also, it should be noted that the US and India have
repeatedly debated on the location savings issue in Mutual Agreement Procedures and many cases are pending before the competent authorities. Arthur, Herbert, Levey,
supra n. 14, p. 800.
17 The OECD’s approach on location savings can be traced back to the OECD’s discussion draft on TP aspects of Business Restructurings. See paras 188–193., OECD Discussion
Draft for Public Comment on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings (19 September 2008). The approach was subsequently incorporated in paras 9.148–9.153, OECD TP
Guidelines (2010). The view was thereafter elaborated in the OECD’s paper on location savings prepared by the OECD Secretariat. See paras 1–11, OECD Paper on Location
Savings (July 2010).
18 Gonnet, Fris, Coriano, supra n. 3, p. 2.
19 Paragraph 9.148, OECD TP Guidelines (2010). The concept is nevertheless defined in the OECD’s paper on location savings ‘as the net savings in costs that may be derived by an
MNE group that relocates some of its activities to a place where labor or real estate expenditures, to cite only a couple of examples, are lower than in the location where the activities were initially
performed’. OECD Paper, supra. n. 17, para. 2. Also see J. Scott Wilkie, ‘Intangibles and Location Benefits’, Bulletin for International Taxation, IBFD, May (2014 – Online
Version), s. 4.
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consideration the functional (FAR) analysis of the parties
and their respective bargaining powers.20
Two examples21 are provided to elaborate on the
concept of bargaining power. The first example22 deals
with relocating basic manufacturing operations (of clothes)
from a Country A enterprise to a Country B enterprise
under a contract manufacturing arrangement. Post
restructuring, all intellectual property (including brand) is
continued to be owned by the Country A enterprise which
also bears substantial risks. It is stated that the relocated
activity is highly competitive and hence it is possible to
use several third party manufacturers. As the bargaining
power of the contract manufacturer in Country B is
relatively low, the guidelines state that this entity would
be attributed, if any, very little part of the location
savings, because in an arm’s length scenario the third party
manufacturers cannot demand higher compensation in a
competitive market.23 The second example, deals with
relocation of specialized engineering services from a
Country X enterprise to a Country Y enterprise also to
optimize labour costs. However, in contrast with the
previous example, the Country Y enterprise is the only
enterprise in its territory to provide the services because it
meets the MNE’s required quality standards. The
guidelines state that location savings (till the extent the
cost savings are not passed on to customers) could be
attributed to Country Y by inter alia using the
transactional profit split method (PSM) because the
bargaining power of Country Y enterprise is higher.24
Further, in its project on revising Chapter VI on
intangibles,25 the OECD systematically states that its
analysis in Chapter IX-Business Restructuring applies in
all cases where location savings is present and is not
restricted to restructurings.26 The draft guidance states, in
determining the location savings that are to be shared
among related parties it is necessary to consider whether
location savings exist; the amount of any location savings;
the extent to which location savings are either retained by
a member or members of the MNE group or are passed on
to independent customers or suppliers; and where location
savings are not fully passed on to independent customers
or suppliers, the manner in which independent enterprises
operating under similar circumstances would allocate any
retained net location savings.27 It is stated that if reliable
local comparables exist then those local market
comparables will provide the most reliable indication
regarding how location savings (not passed on to
customers or suppliers) should be allocated amongst two
or more AEs. Thus, when reliable local market
comparables can be used to determine the arms length
price, comparability adjustments for location savings
should not be required (a preference for local comparables
is expressed).28 Conversely, it is also provided that in the
absence of reliable uncontrolled prices, specific
comparability adjustments for location savings are
required.29
2.3 The UNApproach
The UN TP Manual discusses location savings in the
chapter on Comparability Analysis30 in a holistic manner.
Location savings have been defined as the net cost
savings31 that an MNE realizes as a result of relocation of
operations from a high cost jurisdiction to a low cost
jurisdiction.32 It is also provided that relocation of a
business also gives rise to geographical benefits in addition
to location savings. These benefits could include
availability of highly skilled workforce, proximity to
growing local/regional markets, large client base with
Notes
20 Paragraph 9.149, OECD TP Guidelines (2010).
21 These examples have been discussed in the form of case studies by the general reporters in the IFA 2014 General Report on outsourcing. See Desai and Goradia, supra n. 4,
pp 54–56.
22 The example is similar to the example provided in the US TP regulations. See supra, n. 11.
23 Paragraphs 9.150–9.151, OECD TP Guidelines (2010).
24 Paragraphs 9.152–9.153, OECD TP Guidelines (2010). In our view, it is debatable to whom the location savings should be attributed. It could certainly be argued that an
allocation may take place to the Country Y enterprise as that enterprise performs a highly skilled service in a sector with limited competition. Thus, its bargaining power is
high. On the contrary it may be argued that the bargaining power is not the sole parameter to allocate location savings. The Country X enterprise may still be classified as a
full fledged service provider which undertakes substantial risks. Thus, location savings should be attributed to Country X. See Desai and Goradia, supra n. 4, pp 55–56.
25 OECD Revised Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles (30 Jul. 2013). The project also forms a part of Action point 8 of the OECD BEPS Plan. See OECD
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (19 Jul. 2013).
26 OECD Intangibles, supra n. 25, p. 5.
27 OECD Intangibles, supra n. 25, p. 5. The changes are proposed to be incorporated in Ch. I of the OECD TP Guidelines.
28 Lange, Lankhorst, supra n. 15, p. 226.
29 OECD Intangibles, supra n. 25, p. 5.
30 The Manual also includes an outline of country administrative practices of Brazil, China, India and South Africa. In this regard, China and India have provided their
individual viewpoints inter alia on the concept of location savings and its consideration for determination of ALP.
31 Net cost savings is the difference between cost savings that arise from labour, raw material etc and dis-savings on account of factors such as poor quality of the power supply,
higher costs for transportation, quality control, etc. para. 5.3.2.39, UN TP Manual (2013).
32 The UN Manual, in its description of location savings seems to refer only to a relocation of operations. This would be a deviation from the OECD’s Intangibles Report,
which states that location advantages are relevant not only in a business restructuring, but generally also in all situations where those are present. See Lange, Lankhorst,
supra n. 15, p. 227.
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increased spending capacity, superior information and
distribution networks, advanced infrastructure and market
premium. Such LSAs (that include location savings and
geographical benefits) play a crucial role in increasing the
profitability of the MNE and in determining the
bargaining power of each of the associated enterprises.33
The incremental profit, if any derived from the
exploitation of LSAs is defined as location rents.34 The
Manual explains that the extent to which LSAs lead to
location rents depends on the competitive factors relating
to the end product and general access to LSAs. For
example, it is stated that location rents might exist when a
MNE has exclusive access to LSAs.35 However, location
rents might not exist in a market where competitors also
have access to LSAs, because most of the benefits of LSAs
would be passed on to the customers through lower prices
of products in a competitive market.
With respect to sharing of location rents, it is stated
that the arms length attribution depends on competitive
factors relating to access to the LSAs and realistic
alternatives available to the associated enterprises given
their respective bargaining power.36 Again, the bargaining
power is viewed as a key metric that reflects the behaviour
of two independent parties negotiating over their
respective shares of savings/rents and can be used to
determine the arm’s length allocations when comparable
uncontrolled transactions or benchmarks are not
available.37
3 INDIAN APPROACH
3.1 Preliminary Remarks
Over the last few years, the Indian tax administration has
sought to allocate high mark-ups to captive Indian service
centres by characterizing the Indian affiliate as ‘high value’
or ‘high end’ service providers that generates significant
location savings to the MNE group.38 The administration
has also been challenging cost plus remuneration models
and in certain instances (particularly for research and
development, software and procurement entities) have
used the PSM for determining the arm’s length profit
allocation to India.39 The administration has provided its
view on location savings in the UN TP Manual. The
administration views that India provides MNEs many
LSAs and the resultant location rents should be split
appropriately between the parties.40 The view of the
administration that a comparability analysis by
benchmarking with local comparables will not take into
account the benefit of location savings41 contradicts the
view of the OECD and UN. The administration views that
the arm’s length compensation for location savings and
rent should be such that both the parties would benefit
from participating in the transaction. In other words, it
should not be less than zero and yet not greater than the
value of the locations rent.42 However, the approach of the
administration has not been accepted by the Indian Courts
as evidenced in the following two cases.
3.2 The Li and Fung Case43
In the Li & Fung case, a Hong Kong entity (HK AE)
provided product sourcing services to global customers.
Based on the HK AE’s advice, the customers entered into
contracts directly with the third party vendors. The HK
AE received remuneration from uncontrolled customers at
5% of the ‘FOB value’44 of products sourced. For the
Indian market, the HK AE obtained sourcing services
from its Indian related party (taxpayer). The taxpayer was
remunerated on an operating cost plus 5% basis. The
administration asserted that the taxpayer has performed all
the critical functions, assumed significant risks and has
used both tangibles and unique intangibles developed by
it over a period of time such as supply chain management
and human capital, which had provided significant
advantages to the HK AE. Therefore, an additional profit
on account of location savings should be attributed to the
taxpayer.45 The taxpayer contented that neither the AE
Notes
33 Paragraph 5.3.2.41, UN TP Manual (2013).
34 Paragraph 5.3.2.42, UN TP Manual (2013); A group of authors also arrive at a similar conclusion. See Gonnet, Fris, Coriano, supra n. 3, p. 4.
35 Paragraph 5.3.2.43, UN TP Manual (2013); Gonnet, Fris, Coriano, supra n. 3, pp 3–4.
36 Paragraph 5.3.2.44, UN TP Manual (2013).
37 Paragraph 5.3.2.45, UN TP Manual (2013).
38 Vispi T. Patel, Vishweshwar Mudigonda, ‘Information Technology Industry and Related Transfer Pricing Issues’, Int’l Transfer Pricing J., IBFD, July/August (2007), p. 236.
39 Prashant Prakash, ‘Emerging Transfer Pricing and International tax Issues’, Int’l Transfer Pricing J., IBFD, November/December (2013), p. 376.
40 Paragraph 10.3.7.5 – Para. 10.4.7. 2, UN TP Manual (2013).
41 Paragraph 10.4.7.4, UN TP Manual (2013).
42 Paragraph 10.4.7.4, UN TP Manual (2013); Bipin Pawar, Shilpa Udeshi, ‘Location Savings’, Asia-Pacafic Tax Bulletin, IBFD, September/October (2013), p. 338.
43 Income Tax Appellate Tribunal – Delhi: M/s. Li & Fung (India) Pvt. Ltd v. DCIT, ITA No. 5156/Del/2010, 30 Sep. 2011. Followed by a ruling of the High Court – Delhi: M/s. Li
& Fung (India) Pvt. Ltd v. CIT, ITA No 306/2012, 16 Dec. 2013.
44 Abbreviated for ‘Free on Board’.
45 Dinesh Supekar, Amit Dhadphale, ‘Development of Transfer Pricing Jurisprudence’, Asia-Pacafic Tax Bulletin, IBFD, January/February (2013), p. 45.
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nor the taxpayer was a party to the transaction of export, as
the finished goods were exported by third party vendors to
customers directly and the taxpayer along with its HK AE
merely undertakes the sourcing services. Accordingly,
location savings should only be attributed to the end
purchaser and the taxpayer did not gain any advantage on
account of location savings.
The Tribunal rejected the claim of the taxpayer that
location savings was attributable to end customers and
concluded that the HK AE has also been able to retain
business because the taxpayer had a location advantage to
procure low cost goods. The Tribunal ruled that location
advantage needs to be considered and accordingly 80% of
the 5% commission on FOB value of the goods sourced by
the AE, should be allocated to the taxpayer in India.46
While the decision raises the question on relevance of
location savings/LSAs in transfer pricing, it does not lay
down an analytical framework to evaluate their existence,
quantification, and attribution under arm’s length
conditions. On further appeal, the High Court, in the
view of the authors, has rightfully overruled the ruling of
the Tribunal. The HC ruled that the tax authorities have
not brought any material on record to establish how, and
to what extent the MNE enjoys location savings, and the
Indian taxpayer bears significant risks.47 The High Court
upheld the taxpayers pricing of cost plus mark-up of 5%
as representing an arm’s length remuneration for the
functions performed, assets utilized, and risks assumed by
it, based on the profit margins of comparable Indian
companies selected by the taxpayer in its TP
documentation. The High Court concluded that if any
adjustments are warranted, they should be supported by
demonstrable reason, based on objective facts and the
relative evaluation of their weight and significance.
3.3 The Gap International Souring Case48
The taxpayer, an Indian company was engaged in
providing procurement services to the GAP Group by
facilitating sourcing of apparel merchandise from India
and was remunerated on a cost plus 15% basis. The
administration asserted that under arm’s length conditions
the taxpayer should be earning a commission of 5% on the
FOB value of the goods sourced by the foreign enterprise
through Indian vendors and accordingly made an upward
adjustment. The tax authorities argued that the taxpayer
was not a limited risk support service provider due to the
fact that it played a critical role in the AE’s value chain,
undertook ‘high value’ procurement functions and created
‘procurement intangibles’ through its operations. Thus,
the ‘location savings’ arising from sourcing in India should
be factored in the remuneration model. The taxpayer
argued that it was a low risk service provider that did not
own any supply chain or human capital related
intangibles. The Tribunal ruled that location savings arise
to an industry as a whole. The intent of sourcing from low
cost countries is to survive in stiff competition by
providing lower prices to end customers. Hence, generally
the advantage of location savings is passed on to the end
customers via a competitive sales strategy. Further, it was
held that the arm’s length principle requires
benchmarking to be done in the jurisdiction in which the
taxpayer operates and therefore, comparables selected from
that jurisdiction would also be entitled to the same
location savings, which would generally be factored into
their prices. This conclusion contrasts the view of the
administration expressed in the UN TP Manual and
resembles the OECD and UN view on the subject.49
4 DETERMINATION AND ALLOCATION OF
LOCATIONS SAVINGS: THE ROAD AHEAD
While the framework for determining location savings/
LSAs/ rents in the UN TP Manual is laudable, the
quantification of such parameters could be a highly
complex exercise. To quantify location savings simply by
computing the cost difference before and after relocations
can be misleading. Detailed comparison of each element
related to location savings is required.50 The Supreme
Administrative Court of Finland in its recent ruling on
relocation of manufacturing operations by a parent in
Finland to its subsidiary in Estonia arrived at the
conclusion that location savings could not be determined
due to significant dissimilarities in the handicraft
intensive manufacturing originally carried out in Finland
as compared to the factory type manufacturing in Estonia
(which had a significant impact on the cost base as well as
the effectiveness of the manufacturing operations). The
ruling indicates that location savings can be determined if
the activity carried out in the high cost jurisdiction (pre
location) and low cost jurisdiction (post location) is
substantially similar. Nevertheless, the Court held that
LSAs (such as low cost of production and access to better
production technology) arose in Estonia and such LSAs
Notes
46 The tribunal seems to have reached this conclusion because it had agreed with the tax authorities view that the taxpayer had developed many unique intangibles and also
human capital intangibles, which gave it a location advantage to procure low cost goods.
47 The High Court seems to have agreed that the taxpayer may have created human capital and supply chain intangibles. But these intangibles do not reveal how the taxpayers
bear additional risks.
48 Income Tax Appellate Tribunal – Delhi: GAP International Sourcing v. ACIT, ITA Nos. 5147/Del2011 & 228/Del/2012, 19 Sep. 2012.
49 See Pawar and Udeshi, supra n. 42, p. 338.
50 A reference can be made to Frisch matrix to identify if location rents exist. See Gonnet, Fris, Coriano, supra n. 3, p. 6.
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should be reflected in the arm’s length compensation.51
Thus, even if location savings do not exist, LSAs (only
geographical benefits) might exist. However, quantifying
geographical benefits in an isolated manner is not a
scientific task.
Even if location savings/LSAs and location rents are
defined and quantified, it needs to be determined as to
which entity should take the additional profits – the high
cost jurisdiction entity or the low cost jurisdiction entity
and in what proportion? The current guidance suggests
the bargaining power analysis will serve as a useful
starting point. Bargaining power is generally understood
as the relative ability of parties in a situation to exert
influence over each other. If both parties are on an equal
footing in a debate, then they will have equal bargaining
power, such as in a perfectly competitive market.
However, (as indicated in the various examples discussed
previously) the high cost country entity will have greater
power, for example when its FAR analysis indicates that
this entity plays an active role in the development,
enhancement, maintenance, and protection of intangibles
that are highly valuable for the MNE. In contrast, the
bargaining power of the low cost country entity will be
higher if, for example, it does not depend heavily on the
intellectual property owner and adds value from its own
side to the supply chain. To illustrate, in the
aforementioned Finnish case, the Court analysed the
bargaining power of the Estonian entity and stated that it
was in a better position than its comparables because of its
access to LSAs and competitive level in the market. Thus,
a higher mark-up was justified.52 In the view of the
authors, it could be a highly complex exercise to stimulate
bargaining conditions among related parties.
Conceptually, the authors doubt if genuine bargaining
power among group member actually exits given the
inherent nature of a MNE’s business.53
The most direct way to apportion the location rents
would be through utilizing the CUP54 or the TNMM55
method using local market comparables. However, from a
practical perspective, in most cases, local market
comparables may not exist. Recently, the OECD released a
discussion paper on TP Comparability Data and
Developing Countries.56 The paper addresses concerns
expressed by developing countries about the availability
and quality of financial data needed for application of the
arm’s length principle. The following four approaches are
suggested to address the concerns viz., (1) expanding
access to data sources for comparables;57 (2) more effective
use of data sources for comparables including the
possibility of using foreign comparables or using the
foreign affiliate as the tested party;58 (3) approaches to
reducing reliance on direct comparables and resorting to
other methods such as the PSM or value chain analysis or
adopting safe harbours or use of publicly quoted
commodity prices59 and; (4) using advance pricing
agreements (APA) to prevent disputes and mutual
agreement procedures to resolve disputes.60 The draft does
provide some practical solutions on resolving TP issues
with developing countries. Based on the second approach,
it could be interesting to use foreign comparables for
considering location savings in determining the arm’s
length price. In fact, the Chinese tax authorities, in the
UN TP Manual, explain through an example of a contract
research and development centre, its views on allocation of
location savings by using foreign comparables, in the
absence of local comparables.61 The approach seems
pragmatic even though it defies arm’s length logic as it
does not take into consideration the bargaining power
analysis Also, based on the third approach other complex
methods may be considered such as the contribution
analysis or the Shapely value (a game theory concept)62
under the PSM method to allocate location savings. While
determination and allocation of location savings is a
contentious issue, given the aggressive nature of tax
administrations, it becomes imperative for taxpayers to
maintain robust documentation by carefully considering
and documenting all functions performed, assets used and
risks assumed, as well as the bargaining power of all AEs
Notes
51 Merja Raunio, ‘Supreme Administrative Court Ruling on Location Savings’, Int’l Transfer Pricing J., IBFD, July/August (2013), pp 263–264; Also see Jari Ahonen and Kai
Sajalahti, ‘Finnish Report, Cross-border outsourcing – issues, strategies and solutions’, IFA Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International (2014), pp 295–297.
52 Raunio, supra n. 51, pp 264–265.
53 Wilkie, supra n. 19, s. 4. Another concern is that a static determination of the bargaining power may not be appropriate as each parties power may change on a year to year
basis.
54 Abbreviated for ‘Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method’.
55 Abbreviated for ‘Transactional Net Margin Method’.
56 OECD Paper on Transfer Pricing Comparability Data and Developing Countries (March 2014).
57 Ibid., paras 13–17.
58 Ibid., paras 18–23.
59 Ibid., paras 24–28.
60 Ibid., paras 29–31.
61 See para. 10.3.3.9, UN TP Manual (2013).
62 Gonnet, Fris, Coriano, supra n. 3, pp 7–8.
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involved in the specific transaction(s).63 This would
provide a solid foundation for supporting the
consideration for location savings in intra-group pricing
and defending during audits. Needless to say, if the
taxpayer would like prevent double taxation and obtain
upfront certainty, it may evaluate the issue of location
savings, by resorting to the fourth approach i.e., entering
into a bilateral or unilateral APA with the relevant
jurisdiction.64
Notes
63 Lange, Lankhorst, supra n. 15, p. 230.
64 News paper reports indicate that MNE’s are asked to factor in location savings when they enter an APA with the Chinese tax authorities.
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